Insights · Private Aviation Safety · 9 November 2026

Is Flying Private Really 80 Times Deadlier Than Flying Commercial? What the Numbers Actually Say

A New York Post headline put a single multiple on the risk of private flying, and a Forbes column, as summarized by AviNews, emphasized how rare fatal passenger charter jet accidents are. The sources count different things, and the difference matters to any principal choosing how to fly.

Dark cinematic view of a private jet silhouette on a night apron under a gold-lit horizon

Is flying private really 80 times deadlier than flying commercial? That is the multiple a New York Post headline put on it, and the answer depends on what is counted. The Post figure compares a broad, mixed category of "private charter" flying against scheduled US airlines, which had zero fatalities in 2024, and it measures that gap with a ratio that swings wildly when one side of the fraction is close to zero. The sources reviewed show scheduled airline flying as the safety benchmark, and they also show a very wide spread inside "private aviation" itself: professionally crewed charter and fractional jets sit far from owner-flown light aircraft, and treating them as one number tells a principal almost nothing about the flight they are actually about to take.

This article walks through where the 80x claim comes from, what each source says and why headline ratios depend on their denominators, what the better-defined data says, which variables move risk the most, and what to ask an operator before you board. It is written for principals and the people who run their travel, not for the headline cycle.

Why is everyone asking about private jet safety right now?

On 1 November 2026 a Learjet 60 bound for the Bahamas crashed in Palm Beach County, Florida, and all nine people aboard died. The National Transportation Safety Board is investigating and has not determined a cause, so this article does not speculate about one. Reports so far describe the aircraft as operating a charter flight from Austin, Texas, and we leave the facts of the accident to the investigators. What matters here is the conversation that followed.

Within days, a New York Post piece published on 5 November 2026 carried the headline that flying private is "up to 80X more deadly than commercial airlines". Two days later, on 7 November, Forbes contributor Doug Gollan, who covers private aviation and luxury travel, published a response titled "U.S. Private Jet Passenger Charter Flights Have Enviable Safety Record". Brokers told trade media they were fielding many safety questions from customers, though they had not yet seen a pullback in flying, according to an AviNews summary of the coverage.

Both pieces contain real numbers. They reach opposite tones because they count different things. That is the whole story, and it is worth slowing down to see exactly how.

Where does the 80x figure come from?

The New York Post article is short, and its numbers are specific enough to trace. It makes four quantitative claims that a reader can easily blend into one.

The headline's "up to 80X" and the body text's "about 80 times" are therefore a decade-long, per-flight-hour comparison of a charter category against scheduled airline flying. The article's chart is labelled with a footnote on its "private charter flights" series, which signals that the category definition matters, though the footnote text is not reproduced in the article body we reviewed.

The article also offers explanations for the gap. It cites differences in minimum pilot experience (it says airline pilots typically complete at least 1,500 hours, while charter pilots generally need roughly 500 hours and co-pilots about half that), the absence of a mandatory retirement age for charter pilots compared with the FAA's age 65 limit for airline pilots, and the fact that charter pilots may assess weather alone where airlines use dispatchers. It quotes one expert raising "get-there-itis", the pressure to complete a trip. Those are legitimate points about regulatory differences between airline and charter operations, and the sources we reviewed on charter rules say much the same.

What the Post got right

Three points in the piece hold up, and a fair reading should say so plainly.

First, scheduled US airline flying is exceptionally safe. Zero deaths in a year across millions of passengers is the result of layered rules, dispatch support, mandatory training, and decades of accumulated lessons. Second, there is a documented gap in accident rates: according to Wall Street Journal reporting summarized by AviNews, US charter operators have posted a higher accident rate than airlines every year since at least 2015, and in 2024 the charter accident rate was five times the airline rate. Third, the regulatory structures really are different. Airline operations under Part 121 and charter operations under Part 135 are separate rule sets, with different requirements for pilot experience, retirement age, and dispatch support.

Notice what that Wall Street Journal-derived figure says, though. Five times, for accidents, in one year, is a long way from 80 times. The two numbers are not contradictory, because they measure different things (all accidents versus fatal accidents or deaths, a single year versus a decade, one category definition versus another), but the distance between them is the first clue that the 80x claim is very sensitive to how it is built.

What the Post did not say

The article does not tell the reader how many of those 16 charter deaths occurred on jets, how many on piston-engine air taxis, or how many on other aircraft types. It places helicopters in a separate line, but its "private charter" series is still a broad regulatory bucket. It does not separate fractional programs, corporate flight departments flying their employer's jets, or owner-pilots in single-engine aircraft from the charter figure. And it moves between three denominators (deaths, flight hours, and flight miles) within a few paragraphs, which makes the numbers feel more consistent than they are. The next section explains why each of those choices matters.

Can the 80x figure be trusted?

We could not trace the calculation behind the 80x figure: the Post attributes it to federal statistics but does not publish the arithmetic, and no source we reviewed reproduces it. So this article neither confirms nor rejects the multiple. What can be said is that any ratio of this kind depends on three things: the denominator, the size of the numbers being divided, and the definition of the category on top of the fraction.

Per flight hour, per departure, or per passenger mile?

Safety statisticians use three common exposure measures, and each answers a slightly different question.

None of these is wrong. The problem begins when a piece switches among them without saying so. The Post's headline ratio is per hour, while its general aviation comparison of "500 times" is per flight mile, and its car comparison (airlines about 700 times safer than car travel, citing one study) is on yet another basis. A reader who sees 80, 500 and 700 in one article naturally assumes they are comparable. They are not.

Small numerators and the near-zero denominator problem

Ratios behave badly when one side is tiny. Scheduled US airlines had zero deaths in 2024, and their fatal accident rate has been close to zero for years. When the comparison base is nearly nothing, almost any positive number on the other side produces a large multiple. A small change in the airline figure could move a multiple like "80x" a long way without any change in how safe any passenger actually was.

The same sensitivity applies on the charter side. Forbes' Gollan, as summarized by AviNews, reports that since 2010 only five accidents involving US-registered passenger charter jets have had fatalities. A segment that produces a handful of fatal events since 2010 has a rate that moves noticeably with each event. This is not an argument that the events do not matter; it is an argument that a single decade-long multiple built on a few events carries wide uncertainty that a headline does not convey.

Published sources also express these risks in different ways. The AviNews summary of Wall Street Journal reporting gives a ratio of accidents (five times, in 2024), the Post gives a ratio of deaths over a decade (80 times), and the AviNews summary of Forbes gives raw counts of fatal accidents. These differ in year, in category definition and in whether they count accidents or fatalities, so they cannot be reconciled with one another from the material reviewed.

Category lumping

The deepest issue is what sits inside the numerator. AviNews, summarizing the Forbes piece, puts the point directly: safety statistics for private flying hinge on which regulatory category is counted, and blended figures drawn from Part 91, helicopters and air ambulances distort how charter and fractional segments are judged. In its words, media coverage tends to blend those groups into a single "private flying" number.

Part 135 itself is not a jet-only regime. In general, it governs on-demand and commuter operations by certificated air carriers, a population that ranges from large jets to single-engine piston aircraft, floatplane operators, air-taxi services in remote regions, and helicopter operations. A decade-long per-hour rate for "charter" is an average over all of that. A principal chartering a midsize jet from a well-resourced operator is not randomly drawn from that population.

Labels can be wrong at the edges, too

Even the word "charter" is unstable in coverage. The Post describes the January 2026 Bangor, Maine crash, which killed six, as one of two high-profile chartered plane crashes of the year. The AviNews summary of the Forbes article, by contrast, says the Bangor Challenger 650 crash and the December 2025 Statesville, North Carolina crash that killed former NASCAR driver Greg Biffle both occurred under the less stringent Part 91 rules. We cannot adjudicate those classifications here, and nothing in this article should be read as a finding about either accident. The point is narrower: when reporters and statisticians disagree about whether a flight was charter, owner-flown, or flown under Part 91, a single ratio built from those labels is fragile.

So, how should the 80x be read?

As one reported figure for a broad charter category, over one decade, per flight hour, compared with a scheduled airline baseline that recorded no deaths in 2024. The Post offers it as a headline ratio; Forbes, as summarized by AviNews, emphasizes that counts of fatal accidents for passenger charter jets and fractional programs are low. We do not state here whether private flying is or is not 80 times deadlier, because the sources reviewed do not support that exact framing. The more useful question is "which kind of private flying, run by whom, and under which rules".

Why does "private aviation" lump a Cessna 172 with a Gulfstream?

Because most statistics follow the regulation under which a flight operates, and everyday language follows the feeling of not being on an airline. The result is that a student pilot in a rented two-seat trainer and a four-person crew on a large-cabin intercontinental jet are both "flying private", although almost everything that determines their risk is different. For a principal, four categories matter. They are worth understanding in plain terms.

Part 91, owner-flown

Here the person at the controls is typically the aircraft owner, flying for personal or business reasons, often a single pilot, often in a piston or turboprop aircraft, often with no second crew member and no outside operational oversight beyond the general rules of the air. Training depends on the individual's discipline: recurrent training can be rigorous or minimal. This segment makes up the bulk of general aviation and a very large share of its fatalities. When the Post says general aviation crashes killed 300 people in 2024, this is where most of those deaths sit.

Part 91, corporate or professionally crewed

Many large companies and wealthy families operate their own jets under Part 91 with professional, full-time pilots, often two-pilot crews, often an aviation department with a safety program, sometimes a management company providing oversight. Legally this is still Part 91, the same part that governs the weekend pilot. Practically, the quality range inside this category is enormous. A disciplined flight department that trains twice a year in full-motion simulators, audits itself against international standards and uses a dispatcher or flight-following service may exceed the practices of some certificated carriers. A single-pilot owner of a light jet with no outside audit sits in the same legal category and in a very different place on the risk curve.

The AviNews summary of the Forbes article notes that Aviation International News counted 31 Part 91 business jet accidents with 114 fatalities between 2010 and 2020. Those are counts without matching hours flown, so they are not a rate, and "Part 91 jet" covers both the disciplined and the thinly supported.

Part 135, on-demand charter

A Part 135 air carrier holds an FAA certificate that brings requirements the typical Part 91 operator does not have: an operations specification, a director of operations, a chief pilot, an FAA-approved training program, pilot checking requirements, duty and rest rules, drug and alcohol testing, and maintenance programs with defined oversight. The operator, not the broker who sold you the seat, holds operational control. AviNews, summarizing a charter-industry guide, notes that under 14 CFR Part 295 brokers must disclose the operating carrier before contracting. The FAA publishes a list of aircraft available for charter on certificates; AviNews reports that list contains more than 11,500 aircraft.

Part 135 is nonetheless a floor, not a ceiling. The Post's description of lower minimum pilot hours than at an airline, no mandatory retirement age and no universal dispatcher requirement reflects real differences between Part 135 and Part 121, and charter operators range from small single-aircraft certificate holders to large fleets with safety management systems and third-party audits well beyond what the regulations require. Same certificate type, wide spread.

Part 91K, fractional ownership

Fractional programs, which let several owners share aircraft, operate under Part 91 Subpart K. This regime sits between ordinary Part 91 and Part 135 in its demands: it imposes operational control by the program manager, formal training and maintenance obligations, and management oversight. AviNews, citing the Forbes article, reports that Part 91K has recorded one fatality in tracking dating to 2006: a NetJets-operated Citation Latitude that attempted to land on a highway short of the runway in El Paso, Texas, after engine failure earlier this year, in which one passenger died while the crew and other passengers escaped, described as the first fatal accident in NetJets' 60-year history. For the economics and trade-offs of these programs, see our analysis of whether fractional jet ownership is worth it.

What does the best data show for professionally crewed charter and corporate flying?

The honest answer has two parts. The category-specific counts available in the sources we reviewed are strikingly low for the most structured segments of private jet flying. And the rate statistics are noisier, more contested, and less cleanly sourced than headline writers imply. Both parts belong in any fair reading.

The counts

As summarized by AviNews from Gollan's Forbes piece and a 2021 Aviation International News report:

These are counts, not rates, because the sources we reviewed do not provide matching hours flown for each of those jet-only categories. A count of five fatal accidents over roughly sixteen years cannot be converted to a clean per-hour figure from this material, and this article does not attempt to. What the counts show is that the number of events is larger in Part 91 business jets than in certificated charter jets or fractional programs, but they are not adjusted for how much flying each segment does.

The comparison table

The table below collects only figures from sources we opened, with their basis stated. The figures are not strictly comparable to one another, and the "Basis" column is the point of the exercise.

CategoryFigureBasis and periodSource
Scheduled US air carriers (Part 121)0 deathsCalendar 2024, NTSB data as citedNew York Post
Charter (Part 135), all aircraft16 deaths; 13 more deaths on charter helicoptersCalendar 2024, NTSB data as citedNew York Post
Charter versus airlines, accident rateCharter rate five times the airline rateCalendar 2024; higher every year since at least 2015, per federal data cited by the Wall Street JournalAviNews, summarizing the Wall Street Journal
Charter versus airlines, fatal rate"80 times" more deadlyDecade, per 100,000 flight hours, broad charter categoryNew York Post
Passenger charter jets (Part 135)5 fatal accidents2010 to November 2026 (3 in 2010 to 2020, then 2 more)Forbes (Gollan) and Aviation International News, as summarized by AviNews
Fractional (Part 91K)1 fatalityTracking dating to 2006Forbes (Gollan), as summarized by AviNews
Part 91 business jets31 accidents, 114 fatalities2010 to 2020Aviation International News, as summarized by AviNews
General aviation overall300 deathsCalendar 2024, NTSB data as citedNew York Post
General aviation overall, fatal accident rateAbout 0.93 (FY 2022) falling to about 0.68 (FY 2024) per 100,000 flight hoursFAA fiscal-year rate; the lowest since tracking began in 2009AviNews (FAA data as reported by AviNews)

Read the table as a map of uncertainty rather than a ranking. The rows use different years and definitions. The count rows and the rate rows cannot be divided into one another. And the one row that produces "80" is the row with the broadest category.

Where in a flight is the risk concentrated?

Risk is not spread evenly across the hours of a flight. Industry safety analyses, including long-running airline and business aviation studies, consistently find that a disproportionate share of accidents occurs during takeoff, initial climb, approach and landing, even though those phases occupy a small fraction of total flight time. Cruise, which dominates hours flown, contributes comparatively little. We describe this pattern in general terms rather than quoting a single percentage, because the exact split varies by study, aircraft class and period.

That pattern has two practical consequences for a principal.

First, it is why the denominator matters so much. A rate per flight hour flatters a transcontinental flight and penalizes a series of short positioning legs. A person who takes many short hops in a year takes on more takeoffs and landings per hour than the airline passenger who flies a handful of long sectors, and a per-hour comparison will not show that.

Second, it explains why airports, runways and approach conditions matter as much as the aircraft. Private jets can reach smaller airports that airlines do not serve. That is one of their main benefits, and it also means shorter runways, fewer approach aids, less rescue and firefighting capacity, and sometimes terrain or weather less forgiving than a major hub. A well-run operator prices that into its planning, with minimums for runway length, alternates, fuel, and weather. A less disciplined one may not.

What changes risk the most?

If you strip the debate to the variables a principal can actually influence, a handful of factors do most of the work. The ordering below reflects the weight of evidence in published safety literature and the themes in the coverage we reviewed, not a numeric ranking.

1. The regulatory category and the operator, in that order

The single biggest lever is whether the flight is operated by a certificated air carrier or program with formal oversight, and then how good that particular operator is. The counts in the previous section are lower for certificated passenger charter jets and fractional programs than for Part 91 business jets, although they are not matched by hours flown and prove nothing about cause. Within Part 135, though, the quality of the individual operator varies widely, and the certificate is a floor rather than a guarantee. A reputable independent audit or safety rating from a firm that evaluates operators adds information the certificate cannot.

2. Crew composition, experience and recurrent training

Two qualified pilots are a significant defence against the errors that ruin single-pilot flights. Beyond the number of pilots, the useful questions concern their experience on the specific aircraft type, how recently they completed full-motion simulator training, and whether the operator trains to standards above the regulatory minimum. The Post notes that charter minimums are lower than airline minimums. Many operators set their own hiring floors well above those minimums, and a principal can ask what theirs is.

3. Operational control and the freedom to say no

Several accident investigations over the years have turned on schedule pressure or a passenger-driven wish to complete a trip. The Post's reference to "get-there-itis" is a familiar term in this literature. The structural defence is a culture, and a contract, in which the pilot in command has unquestioned authority to delay, divert or cancel without commercial penalty to anyone. Principals can reinforce that culture themselves by making clear to their staff and to the crew that a late arrival is always preferable to pressure on the flight deck. It costs nothing and it reduces a documented risk.

4. Weather decision-making and dispatch support

The question is not whether an operator flies in weather, because everyone does, but how decisions are made: who reviews the forecast, who has authority to stop a flight, whether a second set of eyes outside the cockpit looks at the route, and what the written policy says about thunderstorms, icing and contaminated runways. Operators that use certified dispatchers or an equivalent flight-following function, and that publish conservative weather minimums, are reducing exposure to one of the recurring hazards of aviation.

5. Aircraft, equipment and maintenance

Aircraft age, maintenance records, equipment such as terrain awareness and collision avoidance systems, and the maintenance provider's track record all matter, though in practice they rank below operator and crew quality for most passengers, because a disciplined operator tends to maintain well and an undisciplined one tends not to. If you are considering buying rather than chartering, the stakes shift toward you as the owner, and our checklist for buying a used private jet covers records, inspections and pre-purchase due diligence.

6. Whether the flight is truly what you think it is

A flight sold as charter that is not operated under a valid Part 135 certificate removes protections the passenger assumed they had, including insurance and oversight arrangements. Confirming the operating carrier and its certificate before you pay is basic hygiene. It also bears on how you buy: broker, jet card, or direct charter relationships differ in how visible the operating carrier is. Our comparison of jet cards versus on-demand charter explains how these structures treat the operator relationship, and our piece on the cheapest ways to fly private flags where cost pressure can quietly become safety pressure.

What should you ask your operator before you fly?

These questions are practical, they are reasonable for any principal or travel manager to put to a charter company, fractional program or management company, and a good operator will answer them without defensiveness.

  1. Who is the operating carrier, and what is its Part 135 certificate or Part 91K program status? Ask for it in writing, and confirm that the tail number is on that certificate.
  2. Is there an independent safety audit or rating, and when was the last one? Ask what it covered and whether the operator shares the summary.
  3. What is the crew's experience on this aircraft type, and when did they last complete simulator training? Ask also about the operator's own minimum hours, which may exceed the regulatory floor.
  4. Will two pilots fly this trip, and what are the duty and rest limits for this itinerary?
  5. How are weather and routing decisions made, and who can stop a flight? Ask about dispatch or flight-following support and written weather minimums.
  6. Does the pilot in command have full authority to delay or cancel with no commercial penalty to the crew?
  7. Does the operator have a safety management system, and how does it handle reports and near misses?
  8. What are the arrangements for maintenance, and has the aircraft had recent unscheduled events?
  9. Who is insured, for how much, and does the policy cover passengers on this specific flight?

For a deeper framework, including how families and principals structure this process, see our private jet safety due diligence guide.

How should you read the next private jet safety headline?

The fair summary is that scheduled airline flying is the benchmark, that other flying carries more risk, and that how much more depends overwhelmingly on category and operator. A single number cannot carry that. The principal's job is to buy the structure and the discipline, not the label.

Sources and further reading

Want a second set of eyes on your flight program?

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Frequently asked

Is private flying 80 times deadlier than commercial airlines?

The 80x figure appears in a New York Post article, which says it compares charter flights with airlines over a decade, per 100,000 flight hours. We could not trace the calculation. Scheduled US airlines had zero deaths in 2024, so any ratio is very sensitive to a near-zero baseline, and the broad category does not isolate professionally crewed charter or fractional flights.

What is the difference between Part 91, Part 135 and Part 91K?

Part 91 covers general operations, from owner-flown light aircraft to corporate flight departments. Part 135 governs certificated on-demand charter carriers with added training, checking and oversight requirements. Part 91K covers fractional ownership programs, with program-level operational control. The label decides which rules, and which statistics, apply to a flight. Ask which one applies to your flight.

Why do accident statistics for private aviation vary so much?

Sources differ on the period, the category and the exposure measure: per flight hour, per departure or per passenger mile. Hours flown in general aviation are also estimates. Blending helicopters, air ambulances and owner-flown aircraft into one figure widens the spread further, so always check the category and denominator. Check each figure's source before comparing.

Is charter safer than owner-flown private flying?

AviNews, summarizing Forbes, reports five fatal accidents involving US passenger charter jets since 2010, and Aviation International News counted 31 Part 91 business jet accidents with 114 fatalities in 2010 to 2020. Those are counts, not matched rates, so they do not show which is safer per flight. Ask each operator for its own record.

What should I ask a charter operator about safety?

Ask who the operating carrier is and confirm its certificate covers the tail number. Ask about independent safety audits, crew experience on the aircraft type, simulator training, two-pilot staffing, weather decision-making, dispatch support, safety management and insurance. Also confirm the pilot in command can delay or cancel without penalty. Written answers are better than assurances.

Is a private jet more dangerous than driving?

The sources reviewed do not give a matched comparison between private jet travel and driving. The Post cites one study saying airlines are about 700 times safer than car travel, and nearly 40,000 people died on US roads in 2024. Private jet risk depends heavily on category and operator, so no single comparison fits.

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